# Evaluating the Effectiveness and Robustness of Visual Similarity-based Phishing Detection Models

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# What Are the Phishing Attacks?

1. Select a Target Brand

Phishing Attackers

# What Are the Phishing Attacks?


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


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# What Are the Phishing Attacks?


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# Current Anti-phishing Systems:
# Visual Similarity-based Phishing Defense Models



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# Visual Similarity-based Phishing Defense Models




Reference List of Benign Websites

Training & Learning

Potential Phishing Websites

facebook

facebook.com




FACEBOOK

faceb00k.com




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# Main Research Question

Are these current phishing detection models (visual similarity-based) **effective** against real-world phishing websites and **robust** to adversarial strategies?

# Our Evaluation Pipeline



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


- Developed a web-crawler that visits phishing websites fed by APWG
- Collected from July 2021 to July 2023 (**25 months)** → **6.1M** samples
- Obtained **451k** samples after removing error pages and sampling

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# Our Evaluation Pipeline




***Retraining***: To ensure fair evaluation, the models should share the same reference knowledge of brands.

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# Our Evaluation Pipeline




Using a real-world phishing dataset and a manipulated dataset to evaluate effectiveness and robustness.

# Results: Overall Detection Performance

- Detection performance **degradation** (**20.7%**) compared to their results on curated datasets

| **Models** | **Ref. Type** | **Detection** ($R_{ext}$) | | | **Identification** ($R_{ext}$) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | $N_{tp}$ for $D_{all}$ ($N_p$: 451,514) | $N_{tp}$ for $D_{learn}$ ($N_p$: 312,355) | $N_{tp}$ for $D_{sample}$ ($N_p$: 4,190) | $D_{learn}$ $I_{tp}/N_{tp}$ | $D_{sample}$ $I_{tp}/N_{tp}$ |
| DynaPhish | Logo | ---- | ---- | 22.03% | ---- | 97.94% |
| PhishIntention | Logo | 52.68% | 66.22% | 49.07% | 97.72% | 98.56% |
| Phishpedia | Logo | 70.47% | 87.97% | 57.16% | 96.67% | 92.36% |
| Involution | Logo | 66.67% | 84.77% | 60.57% | 99.64% | 97.32% |
| PhishZoo | Logo | 86.28% | 86.36% | 76.13% | 33.26% | 9.59% |
| VisualPhishNet | Scr. | 41.33% | 40.58% | 33.84% | 66.03% | 54.51% |
| EMD | Scr. | 30.28% | 31.34% | 27.45% | 22.91% | 20.42% |

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# Detection-Failed Cases (Three Adversarial Strategies)

1) Model Pipeline Attack

Benign


Phishing


Blurred


Color

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# Detection-Failed Cases (Three Adversarial Strategies)

1) Model Pipeline Attack

2) Mimic Visualization

Benign



Phishing


Blurred


Color


Font

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# Detection-Failed Cases (Three Adversarial Strategies)

1) Model Pipeline Attack

2) Mimic Visualization

3) Direct Simple Strategies

Benign

Phishing

Blurred

Color

Font




Logo Elimination

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# Robustness of Visible and Perturbation-based Manipulations

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# Robustness of Visible and Perturbation-based Manipulations

- **Logo-based methods** are disrupted for brand identification (Phishpedia: 15.72% for integration, 16% for case conversion);
- **Screenshot-based methods** exhibit lower detection rate (VisualPhishNet: 27.27% on benign samples).

Original


Integration


Case Conversion

# Key Takeaways

1. Performance degradation (**20.7%**) compared to their results on curated datasets
2. Need for robust, multi-modal defenses that don't overly rely on single features (e.g., logos or exact visual patterns)
3. The dataset is publicly available at https://moa-lab.net/evaluation-visual-similarity-based-phishing-detection-models/

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